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[Abstract]
This paper explores policy developments over the issue of migrant care work-
ers (MCWs) in Japan, Korea, and Italy. These three countries have a lot of
problems common to “familialistic” welfare regimes but have implemented a va-
riety of policies regarding the introduction of MCWs. For the past two decades,
Italy has introduced an enormous number of MCWs in both formal and informal
ways. While Japan has opened only a small window, Korea has paved the road
toward the introduction of MCWs in a rather drastic way.
To explain the variety among MCW policies, this paper focuses on strategic
decision making in an institutional opportunity structure demarcated by labor
market policy, immigration policy, and welfare policy. The paper hypothesizes
that the variety of policies for introducing MCWs in Japan, Korea, and Italy
should be explained by the combination of two variables : the regulation of fi-
nancing care services by MCWs and the upward mobility of MCWs.
The comparative analysis shows that the more regulated the mode of financ-
ing Long-term care (LTC) and the higher the level of mobility in the career
paths of MCWs, the more the demand and supply of MCWs will respectively be
crowded out. The outcome should shed light on the importance of focusing on
the strategic interaction between the demand side (e.g., the elderly, the gov-
ernments of the receiving countries) and the supply side (MCWs). Therefore, it
will contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between welfare politics
and migration politics in a globalizing political economy.
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1. Migrant care workers and the “familialistic” welfare regime
in Southern Europe and East Asia
Since the beginning of the 1990 s, the issue of immigration and welfare has at-
tracted growing attention, not only in the real world of politics but also in the
research of political science. Most of the argument has concentrated on the
“demand” side of immigration, such as the right of immigrants to welfare provi-
sion (Sainsbury 2012) and “welfare chauvinism.” On the other hand, the supply
side of welfare provision by immigrants and, more so, the nexus between them
have been understudied. Nevertheless, as the seminal work of Esping-Andersen
(Esping-Andersen 1990) indicates, the nexus of welfare, the labor market, and
migration policy is the crux of welfare regimes. Given rapidly increasing immi-
gration, immigrants should no longer be seen as welfare-receivers or as caregiv-
ers. We should integrate the two aspects and treat them as a strategic actor in
political economies.1
This paper explores the policy developments regarding the issue of migrant
care workers (MCWs) in Japan, Korea, and Italy. These three countries have a
lot of problems common to “familialistic” welfare regimes (e.g., rapid-aging, un-
derdeveloped provision of public health care). In the familialistic welfare re-
gime, the introduction of MCWs is expected to be an exit from the stalemate
with the imminent shortage of care labor. The three countries, however, have
pursued contrasting policies on the introduction of MCWs. Italy has introduced
1 This paper is the revised version of the paper submitted for the presentation at
the 13 th Annual ESPAnet Conference, in Odense, Denmark, September 3–5,
2015 (Stream 6 : Comparing European and Asian Worlds of Welfare). The author
appreciates the comments from Li-jin Hong, Stefano Sacchi and Margarita Estevez
-Abe, Young Jun Choi.
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an enormous number of MCWs in both formal and informal ways. While Japan
has opened only a small window, Korea has paved the road toward the intro-
duction of MCWs in a rather drastic way.
To explain the variety among MCW policies, this paper focuses on strategic
decision making in an institutional opportunity structure demarcated by labor
market policy, immigration policy, and welfare policy. It stresses the impor-
tance of [1] funding for long-term care (cash for families in Italy and Korea,
public insurance in Japan), [2] regulation of migration, and [3] opportunities in
the labor market for migrants. It reveals that an especially decisive aspect is
that of skill formation for migrants, as stated by social investment welfare the-
ory. The paper hypothesizes that the variety of policies for introducing MCWs
in Japan, Korea, and Italy should be explained by the combination of two vari-
ables : the regulation of financing care services by MCWs and the upward mo-
bility of MCWS. The more regulated the mode of financing LTC and the higher
the level of mobility in the career paths of MCWs, the more the demand and
supply of MCWs will, respectively, be crowded out.
In the following sections, the paper first argues the context of the introduc-
tion of MCWs and draws a hypothesis (Section 2). Then, as case studies, it ex-
plains the process of introduction in the three countries (Section 3). Finally, it
summarizes the main findings and reframes the significance of MCWs in the
three countries. In addition, it will discuss the possible significance of its re-
sults to welfare and migration research.
Exit from the stalemate? : The introduction of migrant care workers in Japan, Korea, and Italy
5
2. The contexts and the framework : Migrant care workers in
the “familialistic” welfare regime
2.1. The existing arguments on the introduction of migrant care work-
ers
In advanced economies, long-term care (LTC) has recently been the most criti-
cal issue in welfare reforms. As a matter of policy, while public pensions and
health care have little room for innovation in the era of economic crisis and
globalization, LTC has a lot of problems remaining to be tackled and has a large
amount room for reforms. As a level of theory, while the remaining options for
pension and health care reforms appear to be converging to ongoing retrench-
ment, there are a variety of alternatives for care reforms reflecting the institu-
tional legacies of welfare regimes.
Among different welfare regimes, the familialistic welfare regimes in South-
ern Europe and East Asia should be confronted with the most acute shortage
of LTC because of their rapidly aging populations, decreasing fertility rates and
pension-biased social security systems. The burden of care has to concentrate
on shrinking families, with little supply of public and marketized care services,
and on insufficient cash transfer to families (Ferrera 2005).2
This is the reason why the introduction of MCWs has been focused as a
promising way out from the stalemate in familialistic regimes. The inflow of
MCWs has been expected to fill the gap between growing care demand for care
and inadequate supply of services. The argument for the marketization of care
and the extension of MCWs has validated that alternative in the literature of re-
2 These three options respectively correspond with social democratic regimes, lib-
eral regimes, and conservative regimes.
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cent welfare research (Shutes and Chiatti 2012).
Such argument, nevertheless, appears to be difficult to develop in South
European and East Asian welfare states. There are cumbersome dilemmas for
these countries. First, ideologically, the introduction of MCWs could contradict
the traditional view that the family, especially women, should provide LTC.
Second, the restrictive and anti-immigration sentiment of the migration regime
could hamper the opening to of jobs to MCWs. Third, familialistic welfare re-
gimes have not been equipped with possible institutional channels for introduc-
ing MCWs and linking them to the elderly ; such would include, for example,
public facility and home care services or a pre-existing market of care services.
Fourth, the rigid labor market regime protects existing care jobs and cannot of-
fer sufficient opportunities to MCWs. Fifth, in the era of globalizing care chains,
discouraging conditions of globalization could result in limited growth and eco-
nomic stagnation that may result in an inadequate number of MCWs entering
the care market.
It is significant, therefore, to see how these countries have been dealing with
these four dilemmas and why they have chosen particular alternatives. As is
discussed in the following, the familialistic regime has been tackling such diffi-
culties, partly in a similar way and partly in a different way.
2.2. The similarities and the differences in Japan, Korea, and Italy
This paper analyzes the policies of introducing MCWs in Japan, Korea, and Italy.
In the familialistic welfare regime, the policies of these three countries have
not only a wide range of commonalities but also a broad variety and fit for
comparative small case studies of similar system designs.
In terms of care regimes, the three countries are similar in that the supply of
public facility care services was poor and the families, mainly women, took care
of elderly care labor. Similarly, the introduction of MCWs, at least originally, be-
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gan as a final, unavoidable but undesirable policy choice. On the other hand,
the countries are different in terms of institutional preconditions and policies.
While Japan and Korean recently introduced long-term care insurance (LTCI)
for financing care service and, thus, steered into universalism, Italy continues
to rely on its cash and care policy. The coverage of the LTCI differs between
Japan and Korea. Financial support for care is relatively generous in Japan and
Italy but not in Korea. The scopes of introduction of MCWs are extensive in It-
aly, moderate in Korea, and timid in Japan. The MCWs in each country have
different origins. In Italy, they have been adopted from an existing pool of im-
migrants. Korea opened the door to overseas co-ethnic Korean women. Japan
opted for young women from former colonial countries within the framework of
a free trade agreement.
Next, the migration regimes are very restrictive. Originally, the three nations
were sending countries, and they have transformed into receiving countries
only recently. Regulations have since more strictly limited the accession of im-
migrants. On the other hand, the actual speed and magnitude of the accessions
are highly divergent. Italy has been flooded with immigrants, particularly since
the 1990 s, being in the midst of European integration and in the closest posi-
tion to developing countries. Japan has only selectively opened the door to co-
ethnic migrants while Korea has strategically opened the door as a social in-
vestment welfare policy.
The three countries’ labor market regimes have both interesting similarities
and differences. They are basically rigid from a comparative perspective, and
people can enjoy a high level of job security. On the other hand, the working
conditions of MCWs, and the standard wages of authorized ones in particular,
are mainly regulated by, in Japan the LTCI, in Korea the (private) market, and
in Italy by the nationwide collective agreement.
In addition, these similarities and differences indicate that not only should
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the settings of welfare regimes, migration regimes, and labor market regimes be
noted respectively but also the nexus of the three regimes should be critical to
understanding the dynamics of MCWs and welfare politics. Therefore, a com-
parative analysis of the three countries should be valuable beyond the scope of
explaining variation among regimes. It can also contribute to the research of
social policies.
2.3. The theoretical framework and hypothesis
The theoretical framework
To explain the variety of MCW policies, this paper focuses on strategic decision
making in an institutional opportunity structure demarcated by labor market
policy, immigration policy, and welfare policy. It stresses the importance of
funding for LTC, regulation of immigration, and opportunities in the labor mar-
ket (see Figure 1).
The first factor, funding for LTC, should influence the mix of authorized
MCWs in the public scheme, MCWs in the private care market, and unauthor-
ized (and illegal) MCWs ; the more the funding is regularized by public frame-
work, the more the number of authorized MOWs increases in the public care
market and decreases in the private and illegal care market. This factor is asso-
ciated with the policies and the politics of each country, that is, how these
countries have adapted to the challenges.
The second factor, the regulation of immigration, can affect the quantities
and the qualities of MCWs ; depending on policy goals, the targets of the intro-
duction of MCWs could be toward co-ethnic groups, gender-specified (in most
cases, women), or sector-specified quotas. The third factor is opportunities in
the labor market of accession countries and beyond ; MCWs, though tradition-
ally considered economically disadvantaged and socially passive in developed
countries , should be regarded as strategic actors seeking upward mobility
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across the sectors and across national borders.3
However, while the existing research has focused on the demand side for
MCWs (e.g., the state, interest groups, the elderly in receiving countries) in po-
litical science and the supply side of MCWs (e.g., immigrants and other “push”
factors in sending countries) in some migration and gender studies, this paper
emphasizes the importance of strategic interactions between the two sides in
the institutional opportunity structures surrounding the introduction of MCWs.
Hypothesis
i. Apart from several intervening variables, the most critical variable in the de-
mand for MCWs should be the mode of financing LTC. It may also be af-
fected by the regulation of migration.
3 Migrant care workers are often more highly educated (in their home countries)
than the average care worker in a receiving country. This might be a mismatch in
terms of human capital investment. Thus, they face problems in career develop-
ment. This reveals that, as social investment welfare theory states, the aspect of
skill formation is especially decisive for migrants.
Figure 1 : Theoretical Framework
The mode of financing MCWs
regulated or self -paid?
The mobifily for MCWs
rigid or flexible?
Regulation of immigration
The demand for MCWs The supply of MCWs
Mismatch
between the demand and the
supply
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・ The value of this variable varies between “regulated” and “self-paid.”
・ “Regulated” means that care services by MCWs are paid from a publicly
regulated fund. The most typical is the LTCI. In this case, the condi-
tions for adopting MCWs are determined by law. Benefits are calculated
and conditioned on public law and agencies.
・ “Self-paid” means that care services by MCWs is paid from the privately
pooled money. The origins of money can be pension benefits, family al-
lowances, care benefits, personal wages, or other personal money of the
elderly or their families. In this case, the elderly and their families have
more freedom to choose among different services.
ii. The variable influencing the supply can be the mobility of the career paths
of MCWs, which would affect their strategic actions. The supply may also be
affected by the regulations of migration.
・ The value of this variable varies between “rigid” and “flexible” : it can
be affected by the level of skills and education and by formal and infor-
mal regulations regarding immigration and care in and across receiving
and sending countries.
・ “Rigid” means that there are few opportunities to move upward in re-
ceiving countries or across national borders. This can be applied to
MCWs with lower skill levels, ethnically conditioned MCWs, and/or to
MCWs accepted based on legal quotas.
・ “Flexible” means that there are plenty of opportunities to move upward.
This can be applied to MCWs with high skill levels and high education
or to MCWs who are more adaptable to moving across sectors and na-
tional borders.
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iii. The hypothesis of the paper is as follows.
In the policies of introducing MCWs in Japan, Korea, and Italy, a high level of
regulation in financing LTC and a high level of mobility in the career paths of
MCWs would respectively crowd out the demand for and the (long-term) sup-
ply of MCWs.
・ The more regulated the mode of financing is, the smaller the number
of MCWs would become : Since regulated financing keeps the costs for
receiving care services by MCWs at a high level, above the minimum
age, the incentive to hire MCWs would decrease. (Also, the incentive to
enter the care market would increase for domestic workers. On the
other hand, the larger the degree to which LTC is self-paid, the larger
the demand for MCWs will be : Since self-payment leaves the users
more freedom in choosing care services, there would be a greater vari-
ety of care services (public, private, unauthorized, and illegal)). In the
end, there would be more demand for MCWs since the cost would be
contained.
・ The more flexible the (upward) mobility for MCWs becomes, the more
the supply of MCWs in the short run would increase, but the smaller
the supply would become in the long run : While flexible mobility may
be attractive to immigrants deciding whether to the care market , it
would make it difficult to keep MCWs in the care sector of the receiv-
ing countries. On one hand, rigid mobility would hinder the potential
for attracting various groups of immigrants to the care market, but on
the other hand, MCWs with no other alternatives would still enter, and
once they entered, they could be secured.
・ Each case can be classified in a 2 × 2 diagram of the comparative theo-
retical map (see Figure 3).
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3. Case study : The introduction of migrant care workers in
Japan, Korea, and Italy
3.1. Japan
Background
Japan, in the 1900 s, had the fastest-aging population among developed coun-
tries, and this endangered the traditional model of home care in which families,
and especially women, were expected to provide LTC ; it also endangered the
alternative of “facility care,” in which LTC was funded from health care insur-
ance and, thus, was dealt with in the framework of health care. The growing
demand for LTC and the severe shortage of care workers drew attention to
MCWs as a solution.
Also in the 1990 s and the early 2000 s, the migration regime and the labor
market regime started to fundamentally change. Japan opened its doors to im-
migrants through EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements).4 The MCWs were
Flexible mobility
Self-paid finance Regulated finance
Figure 2 : The comparative theoretical map
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expected to be recruited based on EPAs with some Southeast Asian countries
that were concluded in the 2000 s. After the first EPA with Singapore in 2002,
the Japanese government negotiated EPAs with the government of the Philip-
pines, the Indonesian government, and the Vietnamese government. The de-
regulation of the labor market has progressed, and there has emerged a vast
pool of atypical workers that could be channeled into care labor market. This
expectation, however, was not sufficiently met, and the shortage of care labor
has continued to be a grave problem.
The recent situation of MCWs in Japan
During the negotiation, both sides fought over the accession of nurses and care
workers from these three countries. The governments of the three countries
promoted the “export” of nurses and care workers to the Japanese market as a
strategic industry. On the other hand, the National Nurse Associations in Japan
bitterly opposed the opening of the labor market, fearing the deterioration of
working conditions due to the competition with foreign workers (Anri 2007).
The EPAs with the Philippines and Indonesia were enacted in 2008, and the
EPA with Vietnam in 2009. Based on these agreements, the Japanese govern-
ment introduced ‘care work candidate’ programs. Japan committed to accepting
up to 1000 nurse candidates and care worker candidates from the Philippines
and Indonesia during the first two years (Michel and Peng 2012 : 412).5
Japan started to accept candidate nurse and care workers from Indonesia in
4 An EPA, as a kind of FTA(Free Trade Agreement), covers not only the liberaliza-
tion of trade but also that of the service sector.
5 “Care work candidates (trained nurses and care workers in their own home coun-
tries) are given work placements in receiving institutions in Japan and paid the
same wages as Japanese care workers, for a period of up to 4 years, on the condi-
tion that they pass the Japanese care workers’ licensing examination within 4
years” (Michel and Peng 2012 : 412).
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2008, the Philippines in 2009, and Vietnam in 2014. However, taking into the
consideration these contrasting demands, the Japanese government put some
limits on the conditions of the accession of MCWs. The MCWs coming to Japan
based on the EPA are required to (1) have a sufficient level of fluency in
speaking and writing in Japanese, (2) pass the same national certification exam
for nurses and care workers as Japanese nurses and care workers, (3) be hired
under the same conditions as Japanese workers (e.g., salaries), and (4) can
only work in a nursing home or a care house (that is, they cannot work inde-
pendently or offer personal home care) (Ogawa 2014 : 7).
The ambitious target numbers set by the Japanese government, however,
have resulted in a failure. The numerical target was set at 1,000 per year for
the first two years. It is said that, behind this large number was the intensive
lobbying of the interest group of the care industry, which was seeking to re-
solve the serious problem of insufficient manpower (Idei 2015). In fact, a total
of 880 Filipino and Indonesian candidates entered Japan through the program
in 2009.
Since they initially received only six months of language training with very
little follow-up support, only the three passed the examination in 2011 for the
first time. Discouraged by the low success rate, the number of candidates to
Japan dropped to 118 in 2011 (Michel and Peng 2012 : 412).
In addition to the MCWs who entered Japan through the EPAs, there have
been others who came by different routes. Although no formal statistics exist,
marriage migrants have increasingly been employed as care workers . There
have been many resident foreigners eligible for recruitment into care work .
While Japanese Brazilians and Japanese Peruvians, who have entered from the
late 1990 s after being given special status, have not chosen to work as care
workers, Filipinos who entered Japan before the turn of the century did. Many
of these are Filipinas who originally came to Japan in the 1970 s and 1980 s un-
Exit from the stalemate? : The introduction of migrant care workers in Japan, Korea, and Italy
15
der entertainers’ visas and have since either gained permanent residency or
married Japanese men. Another group of residents who are recruited into care
work are Nikkeijin―people of Japanese descent (Michel and Peng 2012 :
412).6
The number of MCWs, nevertheless, is very limited in Japan. Most of the eld-
erly care is supplied through private networks based on family relationships,
semi-public and private care corporations based on the LTCI, and (long-term)
hospitalization based on medical insurance. The numbers of MCWs whose entry
was based on the EPA have remained small. Because of the unsuitable condi-
tions explained above, most of the candidates cannot pass the certification ex-
ams and have given up working as MCWs. Because of this, they have had to re-
turn home since Japanese immigration law does not allow them to extend their
stays.
The undersupply of and lack of demand for MCWs in Japan
Following the introduction of the LTCI in 2000, LTC in Japan has become de
-familiarized and less de-commodified. The institutional framework of the LTCI
has been crowding out the supply of informal and non-institutionalized care by
MCWs and more so, that by unauthorized migrants.
The supply of MCWs, nevertheless, has been far less than the target set by
the Japanese government. The number of candidate applications has been far
less than expected. The number who have passed a certification exam is small ;
in the 2015 exam, it was only 78.
6 The 2008 Nationality Law recognized children of Japanese nationals in former
Japanese colonies, such as the Philippines, granting them the right to Japanese
citizenship and permanent residency if the Japanese parent acknowledges the
parentage. Increasingly, these ‘co-ethnic foreigners’ are seen as potential care
workers and are recruited to care work in Japan (Michel and Peng, ibid.).
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First, the qualification of care workers as having passed the exam is linked to
the level of nursing care benefits from the LTCI. As suppliers of care services,
care corporations have strong incentives to supply care service in compliance
with the rules of the LTCI and do not dare to hire unauthorized and illegal im-
migrants. Second, the certification for LTC required by local administrations is
not generous, but it is fair. The certification rate was around 17.8% in 2013
(MHLW 2013 : 8). Therefore, as users of care service, the elderly or their fami-
lies have little incentive to hire unauthorized services. (This is not the case in
Korea.) Third, there have been a wide variety of LTC services, such as Special
Elderly Nursing Care Houses, run by local governments or special welfare cor-
porations, long-term hospitalization services, (private) pay nursing homes, and
paid or insured home care services.
In Japan, the supply and demand for MCWs, therefore, has been kept quite
low.. Of course, the care industry has been facing a serious manpower shortage,
and some local governments have tried to increase the MCW by supporting and
training authorized immigrants. Nevertheless, the institutional setting of the
LTCI has had the effect of curbing the need for MCWs.
Of course, there is the possibility that the elderly would seek to employ
MCWs. Although the expense of care services is covered by the LTCI and the
subsidy from national and local governments, the users have to pay 10% of the
cost. From August 2015 on, the cost is 20% for people above a given threshold
of annual income. In addition, the subsidy proportion has been cut gradually,
and the financial situations of Japanese families have been continuously dete-
riorating during the “Lost Two Decades.” Such condition might induce the eld-
erly and their families to seek care service by unauthorized MCWs, as have the
realms of rural agriculture and construction sector when facing serious labor
shortages.
A similar possibility has already been realized in some cases of marriage im-
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migrants, but these have been the exception by far. Regular services through
the LTCI are still attractive since self-pay is only 10%, and most of the ex-
penses can be covered by the LTCI and government subsidies, as explained
above. Moreover, the marketization of care service and the increase of welfare
corporation could offer additional pay service in a more flexible way. Since the
government regulation on care service has limited the costs of care service,
such as payroll, the pay service cost of care service could also be limited. Thus,
the elderly can also rely on such flexible pay services.
Taking into consideration that migration regulations will be, at least for the
near future, neither demand for nor the supply of unauthorized MCWs will
likely jump up.
Career pass for MCWs
The undersupply of MCWs has been caused not only by the institutional setting
of the LTCI but also by the strategic actions of immigrants.
As explained above, for EPA-based MCWs, the conditions are too strict, and
the prospects for employment as a certified care worker are too narrow. The
heavy burden of learning Japanese and preparing for a difficult certification
exam is not worth the risk. The pass rate is only around 40%, though it is im-
proving steadily (MHLW 20015, Press Release on March 26th, 2015 “The result
of EPA-based candidates for the 27th certification exam of a care worker”), and
a lot of candidates have dropped out before and after the examination. If they
cannot pass it, they cannot extend their stay and must go back to their home
countries.7
7 The high risk of working as an MCW include the difficult certification exam, dif-
ference in conditions during one’s trainee period in a different care and nurse
house, and the fact that care workers who do not achieve certification are not
permitted to extend their residence.
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Even for certified care workers, employment as a care worker is not worth
devoting his or her career to. The candidates have usually been among the elite
in their home country, with university degrees or with nurses’ qualifications.
However, the job status of care workers is not high in Japan. The pass rate for
those who want to become nurses in Japan is only about 10% : these are ex-
tremely high odds of failure for such educated individuals. In addition, there
are a lot of countries―such as Canada8 or Korea―that will welcome them with
more favorable conditions in terms of permanent residential status, payments,
and greater accessibility of communication in English. On the other hand, Ja-
pan can give them permanent status only if they continue to work as care
workers after passing a certification exam.
The discrepancy between the high skill level and education of MCWs in their
home countries and their low accession and social recognition in Japan, com-
bined with their opportunities for global mobility, have made it difficult to at-
tract EPA care workers and candidates into the Japanese care market. Due to
these limits, returning home (and working as a professional) or moving to a
more favorable country are seen as the most rational choices for many mi-
grants.9
The situation is a bit different for marriage immigrants, immigrants of Japa-
nese descents, and authorized foreigners already living in Japan. It is similar in
that they have serious problems with understanding Japanese and passing a
certification exam. Although they enter into the care market as home helpers
8 On the case of the inflow of migrant nurses in Canada, see (Gabriel 2011).
9 In March 2015, the cabinet decided on a bill to introduce a new measure for deal-
ing with this problem. Facing with undersupply, the Japanese government will try
to increase the inflow of MCWs by adding care workers to an existing Special
Training Program. On paper, this would transform the accession process into
more flexible one. However, it would channel MCWs into welfare corporations un-
der the auspice of national and local governments.
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(not a legal certification), their numbers are not sufficient to see MCWs as a
significant phenomenon. It goes without saying that few unauthorized immi-
grants work as care workers.
3.2. Korea
Background
In postwar Korea, the responsibility for elderly care was placed on families.
Care service was not socialized or marketized. This idea has been severely chal-
lenged following the political democratization in 1988 and the 1997 Asian Eco-
nomic Crisis (Peng 2011 : 97, 99). The 1993 reform of the Act for the Welfare
of the Aged introduced home care service for the first time, and the 1997 re-
form expanded welfare benefits to families living below the average income
level. On the other hand, facility care service was underdeveloped and was lim-
ited to low-income families (Kim 2014 : 13). Then, in 2008, the LTCI was intro-
duced. The national qualification of “certified care worker” was set up, and
having such qualification became a necessary condition for working in the pub-
lic care sector (Ogawa 2014 : 10)
At the same time, Korea began to transform from a migrant-sending to a
migrant-receiving country beginning in the late 1980 s , when it opened its
doors to Korean-Chinese.10 After the failure of a training program, in the 1990 s,
the Korean government introduced two new frameworks : One is the Employ-
ment Permit System (EPS) for labor immigrants. The other is the Working Visit
System (WVS) for co-ethnic labor migrants. Then, in the 2000 s or so, the Ko-
10 Then, in the early 1990 s, other ethnic groups, such as Filipinos, entered the
country. Facing a steady inflow of immigrants, the Korean government introduced
a special trainee system and, in 1993, changed it to the International Trainee Sys-
tem (ITS). However, as happened in the case of a Japanese trainee system, the
rigidity and ill-treatment of the ITS caused the serious problem of undocumented
immigrants escaping from the ITS framework (Lee 2015).
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rean government began to contain the quotas for immigrants based on the EPS
and the WVS, fearing rising unemployment in the domestic labor market. The
aim is to keep the number of migrant workers under control. Moreover, thanks
to such reforms of the trainee system, the Korean government succeeded in re-
ducing undocumented immigration (Lee 2015).
Ethnic Koreans can get an H-2 (Visit and Employment) visa. This visa is is-
sued to overseas ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship who are seeking less-
skilled jobs. The Overseas Ethnic Korean (F-4) visa is issued to overseas ethnic
Koreans from relatively developed countries, such as the United States. On the
other hand, the H-2 visa is issued to those from economically less advanced
countries, such as China or the former USSR. In fact, over 90% of H-2 visa
holders are ethnic Koreans from China (Seol 2015).
In addition, there are some sources of settled immigrants. First, as for mar-
riage migrants, some local governments in rural areas, facing decreasing popu-
lations and the increasing need for care, funded the “import.” Although there is
no official promotional policy by the central government for marriage migration,
the number of marriage immigrants has steadily been increasing. It has been
said that such an increase has reflected the pressing shortage of caregivers,
which was severe, particularly in rural areas.
Looking into the composition of co-ethnic Koreans, it is striking that the ratio
of women is higher than that among other immigrants and that most of these
co-ethnic women are over 40 years old. In South Korea, the service sector has
not been opened to foreign workers in general, and co-ethnic women are ex-
ceptional in this area (Ogawa 2014 : 12). Therefore, they could substantially
monopolize domestic labor, such as housekeeping and home care.
The recent situation of MCWs in Korea
Although originally the migration regimes and welfare regimes were similar in
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both countries, the magnitude of the introduction and growth of MCWs has
been far greater in Korea than in Japan. This is because Korea had a rapidly
aging population, was less equipped with preexisting public and private (mar-
ketized) care services and slightly late in universalizing care services with the
introduction of the LTCI. Besides, the use of co-ethnic Korean female immi-
grants was a product of policy choice by the Korean government and society to
bridge the gap between the demand and the supply of care workers.
Since the end of the 1990 s and the beginning of the 2000 s in particular, the
Korean government has taken on an explicit social investment strategy for wel-
fare reform (Peng 2011 : 94). The engine of the massive introduction of MCWs
has primarily been the explosively growing care needs for elderly parents” (Lee
2015). In Korea’s case, however, immigration in the face of care and nursing la-
bor shortage has been restricted to Korean co-ethnicity as a basis for eligibility
of immigrants from Russia and China.
First, the choice for co-ethnic Koreans, and especially for Korean Chinese
women over 40 years old, reflected an idea of Korean society being as ethni-
cally homogeneous as possible (Williams 2014). For Korean families who accept
or hire MCWs, it is more convenient to welcome co-ethnic Koreans, who speak
in Korean, and better not to live with young female migrants.
Secondly, the choice also reflected the policy change by the Korean govern-
ment. To fill the demand-supply gap for care workers with as little cost as pos-
sible, the Korean government has utilized existing and potential co-ethnic Ko-
reans through targeted visa policies and human investment policies.
Between 2007 and 2010 the recruitment of Korean descents under the Work-
ing Visit System (WVS) increased from around 93,000 to 334,000, by more than
three-fold (Michel and Peng 2012 : 412). Among co-ethnic Korean women over
40 years old, around 15% work as care workers, according to the estimates by
the Ministry of Labor (Chung, Ah Young 2008 : 88). Also, the promotion of co-
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ethnic Korean marriage migration could be seen as a “hidden” remedy for a se-
rious shortage of care labor, especially in rural areas.
It should be added that there have been serious problems with working con-
ditions for MCWs. High requirements for national certification in the public
framework have pushed a lot of MCWs into the private sector, where they have
found inferior working conditions. Unlike the migrant workers under the EPS,
most these MCWs have not been put under the protection of labor laws and
regulations.
The supply from the backdoor
The demand for, and the supply of, MCWs in Korea has been larger than that
in Japan, and they comprise a significant portion of care workers in the domes-
tic labor market. The causes behind such a situation in Korea have had some-
thing to do with the institutional structure around MCWs.
As for the demand side, the conditions set for the LTCI have curtailed the
chances for the elderly to be cared by MCWs under the formal regulations of
the LTCI. The certification rate for care needs has been kept low. As Seon
(2010= states in his article, it is around 5%, less than one-third of the certifica-
tion rate in Japan. This is because of the Korean government’s fears regarding
financial pressure on the insurance system. Therefore, most of the elderly are
forced to seek care services by MCWs privately, outside the framework of the
LTCI. For them, there should be a vast pool of MCWs not adopted as certified
care workers.
In fact, many co-ethnic MCWs are employed in hospitals and other LTC insti-
tutions, often providing care outside of the publicly regulated LTCI services
and working under worse conditions and with lower wages than domestic li-
censed care workers. (Michel and Peng 2012 : 412 ; Um 2012). The numbers
of co-ethnic MCWs are far larger than those in Japan, and there is more room
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for an unregulated (and, in some cases, illegal and unauthorized) pool of MCWs
not only outside the framework of the LTCI but also outside the legal regula-
tions of immigrant labor markets.
As for the supply side, co-ethnic Korean women tend to seek jobs as MCWs
outside of public frameworks. First, the rigid conditions that must be met to
get a national qualification as a certified care worker have made it quite diffi-
cult for immigrants to pass. For example, they do not have enough time and
money to attend pre-qualification lessons for 240 hours (Ogawa 2014 : 10).
The closeness of other service sectors has filtered women immigrants into the
private market of care labor.
Career pass for MCWs in Korea
In existing migration and gender studies, such choices by women MCWs have
been regarded as a passive choice reflecting economic difficulties in their home
countries. The trend, nevertheless, also reflects strategic choices by female
MCWs themselves.
Immigration policies in South Korea have been very restrictive for low-skilled
foreign workers. Thus, marriage migration is the easiest and cheapest means
available for women who wish to migrate to South Korea (Lee 2015). From a
gender perspective, such choices should be regarded as a subordinate action.
Nevertheless, it could be seen as a more flexible decision than has been argued.
This is shown by the fact that the increase of MCWs following the introduction
of the WVS for co-ethnic Koreans corresponded with the decrease of marriage
immigration of co-ethnic women (Lee 2015).
The room for a strategic choice is far greater for MCWs from the Philippines.
Korea attracted them as an option for social investment welfare and labor mar-
ket policies after the economic crisis in the late 1990 s and the first half of
2000 s. However, as Figure 6.3 (Lee 2015) shows, the more the competition in-
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tensified in the late 2000 s for Filipinas speaking English in global care chains,
the considerably smaller their numbers became. They have flown to new coun-
tries with more favorable working conditions. This trend is in sharp contrast
with the Vietnamese, of whom there was a relatively steady inflow during the
same period.
For Filipino MCWs and (less so) for co-ethnic Korean immigrants in the
midst of competition in global care chains, working in the care sector in Korea
can offer them more chances to adapt at a smaller cost. At the same time,
there has been a steady need for co-ethnic Korean care workers nationwide. As
for co-ethnic Koreans, the government has begun to issue them permanent
resident visas and allow them to work in more flexible conditions.
3.3. Italy
Background
Italy has recently been noted as one of the most rapid aging countries in
Europe. The aging rate was 21.4% in 2014 and the fertility rate, though a little
improved, is only 1.4. Therefore, LTC has been one of the critical policy issues
in recent welfare reform.
There are, however, several bottlenecks for reforming LTC policies. First, the
public pension has occupied most of the resources available for social security.
The level of cash benefit to the elderly and their families has been fairly lower
than in conservative welfare regimes like Germany. The central government
gives attendance allowance (Indennit? di accompagnamento) to the families,
and some local governments provide various types of care benefits. However,
the benefits are not enough to sustain the financial situations and expenses of
the elderly. Second, there have been few public care services or private care
services available to the elderly ; particularly scarce are facility care services.
The percentage of elderly over 65 years old who receive public care services is
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only 4.9%. The supply has been dependent on non-governmental organizations
such as religious associations, charitable organizations, and cooperatives. Thus,
even if the Italian government wants to introduce care reform, it cannot in-
crease the provision of care services or change their quality. Third, there has
been a wide regional gap in the level and contents of care services. In the
North , the local government has attached a significant role to non-
governmental (religious) associations. In the Center, the role of local govern-
ments and cooperatives has been large in organizing and supplying LTC serv-
ices. In the South, the supply of public and non-governmental care services is
not been well developed. The responsibility for LTC is placed largely on the
families and especially on women.
The migration regime in Italy has been more restrictive than in other West-
ern European countries. Italy transformed from a sending country to a receiv-
ing country only in the late 20 th century. The number of immigrants has risen
sharply, particularly since the 1990 s, and has been caught in the flood. The im-
migration laws have become severe during these three decades. The Bossi-Fini
law, introduced under the center-right Berlusconi government, has tightened
the conditions that must be met before a residential permit can be issued : im-
migrants must have already secured a job and signed an employment contract
in advance of their entry into Italy. Nevertheless, the pool of illegal immigrants
has been increasing rapidly.
The combination of the severe shortage of care labor and the rapid growth of
immigration led the elderly to turn their eyes to MCWs as a possible solution.
The recent situation of MCWs in Italy
In the 1990 s, facing an acute shortage of public and private care, the elderly in
Italy began to introduce unauthorized MCWs from the vast pool of illegal immi-
grants that already existed in the domestic labor market (Ambrosini 2013). The
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number of MCWs has risen radically since the 1990 s. It is estimated that, in
2008, about 700,000 MCWs worked in the Italian care market. Their main coun-
tries of origin were Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, and China. The MCWs in Italy
have been recognized as badanti and as socially indispensable workforces in the
elderly care.11
The Italian government first overlooked the introduction of MCWs in families,
and then later permitted and supported it. This was because, as a fundamental
welfare reform for resolving the shortage of elderly care was lacking, it was
seen as wise that the adoption of MCWs into care roles Italian families should
be recognized as a way out of the stalemate.
The Italian government has indirectly but purposefully helped the elderly in
need of care by giving them an attendance allowance (472 euros per month, in
2009). This allowance is offered without any restrictions on use or means of
verifying how it is used, but with its introduction, the government has tried to
financially support families caring for the elderly and encourage them to em-
ploy MCWs. Also, for a few decades, several subnational governments have
given the elderly various care allowances, especially in Central and Northern It-
aly. In addition to the relatively generous public pension, such cash and care
policies are, in part, aimed at supporting the introduction of MCWs into Italian
families.
The government “regularized” existing illegal MCWs working for elderly in
need of care services, allowing these MCWs to apply for legal recognition and,
thus, requiring them to follow the governmental rules. The regularization in
2002 gave legal status to around 330,000. Then, in 2009 around 300,000 were
regularized. In addition, the Bossi-Fini law installed a quota of immigration for
11 About the origins and the changing situation of badanti (MCWs) in Italy, see
Catanzaro e Colombo (2009).
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MCWs. From 2005 to 2007, about 260,000 were “imported” legally for home
care and domestic work. These regular MCWs have been given legal protection.
Their labor contracts are registered, and their salaries are controlled according
to a national collective agreement. They can earn skill-based pay as Italian care
workers do (Calafà 2012 ; Ito 2014 : 15–16).
Furthermore, local governments, NGOs, and trade unions have joined various
services supporting the elderly and MCWs, such as matching services, training
of MCWs in higher-level care skills, protection of working conditions of MCWs,
and organization of MCWs into associations and trade unions.
In Italy, the status of MCWs has been established as an indispensable sup-
plier of LTC on a far larger scale than in Korea and Italy.
Huge potential, but uneven supply and massive demand
The spread of MCWs in Italy, thought widely accepted, has also brought about
serious problems.
There has been a wide mismatch between the demand for, and the supply of,
MCWs. Despite the regularization and the introduction of the quota system, the
majority of MCWs have been unauthorized and illegal ; according to one esti-
mate, only one-third can work as regular MCWs. Compared to immigrant work-
ers in other sectors, the problem of illegal MCWs is said to be more serious,
since only about 20% of labor contracts made before the 2002 regularization
are legal. This rate is worse than that of other industries (Ambrosini 2013, Tab
3.1). Moreover, the applications for co-habitant MCWs in the framework of the
quota system has superseded the quotas every year, by a few times larger.
Thus, most of the applications have been rejected. There has been a huge de-
mand for MCWs that has not been met by the government. In addition, though
this appears contradictory, the number of applications for regularization has
been far below the expectations of the government. In 2009, the government’s
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projected number of applicants was from 500,000 to 700,000, but the actual
number was only 300,000. The recent economic crisis has driven many families
into financial difficulty in which they choose to employ unauthorized and less-
paid MCWs (Ito 2014 : 14).
The causes of such a mismatch can be approached from various points of
view. One is the negative feedback of the institutional structure of the care la-
bor market. In Italy, legally authorized care labor by MCWs or Italian workers
has been under the protection of labor law and collective agreement. For ex-
ample, the minimum wage is set by national collective agreement and does not
vary region by region. The minimum wage for LTC has been set at a higher
level than that of domestic help (Calafà 2012).12 However, the high wages of
authorized MCWs has induced the elderly to hire unauthorized, illegal MCWs at
less expense. Also, the cost of the uniform nationwide minimum wage has been
too high for the economically disadvantaged South. This brought about a seri-
ous shortage in the supply of MCWs.
Another reason for the aforementioned mismatch is the negative effect of the
rigidity of formal migration regimes in Italy. Since the government must pay at-
tention to anti-immigration voices in radical-right parties and in society, the
condition of the regularization and the quota system has been kept restrictive
(Di Santo and Ceruzzi 2010). On the other hand, as the history of repetitive
regularizations has shown, the practical management of such migration regimes
has been substantially flexible, and no serious penalty has been applied to the
elderly who hire illegal MCWs. Therefore, there must be a moral hazard for the
elderly to continue to rely on MCWs outside the formal regulations.
12 The intention of such setting was to attract as many workers as possible to care
labor with the problem of undersupply and to secure jobs with decent working
conditions both for Italian care workers and MCWs. Nevertheless, such setting has
produced grave disparity.
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Career pass for MCWs in Italy
The mismatch between supply and demand should also be seen in terms of the
strategic actions of MCWs.
In Italy, among registered MCWs, the average level of education is higher
than that of Italian care workers. For example, about 70% of Moldavian women
working in care services have bachelor’s degrees. There have been a lot of
young female MCWs in Italy, as opposed to the co-ethnic MCWs found in Korea.
Such highly educated women tend to prefer part-time, or sometimes unauthor-
ized, care labor than in-house care labor (Di Santo and Ceruzzi 2010). This ap-
pears to contradict the fact that working in-house care labor provides more job
security with a higher wage.
Such a seeming paradox can be interpreted as a strategic action in the insti-
tutional settings of the care labor market in Italy. For highly educated women
MCWs, working in the Italian care market is just a beginning of their careers in
Europe.
First, educated female MCWs benefit in terms of gaining opportunities for
entry into Italian and European countries, MCWs can get a working visa more
easily than other immigrants, for whom it is extremely difficult. In addition,
even unauthorized MCWs can expect a remedy as legal immigrants through
regularization by the Italian government.
Second, educated female MCWs are given mobility in and out of Italy. There
has been a higher degree of mobility in Italian and across the European labor
market. Migrants without residential permission can earn “considerable” money
through unauthorized jobs. They can move to more favorable jobs in Italy. Also,
they can move across Europe in a relatively easier way.
Third, the working conditions in the Italian care market are inferior to those
of other professional jobs that could be fit for highly educated women in their
home countries. The conditions are also inferior to those in other Western and
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Northern European countries, such as Germany (van Hooren 2008).
These are the reasons why highly educated women immigrants have little in-
centive to continue to work as MCWs in the long term. For them, it seems
more rational to move to better jobs and to other European countries. In addi-
tion to the above factors, in-house care contains larger risks in terms of human
relationships. Therefore, flexibility of employment is important for educated fe-
male MCWs. They tend to prefer flexibility to stability , even if that means
working under inferior conditions in the short term.
4. Comparative analysis and implications
4.1. The significance of the introduction of migrant care workers in Ja-
pan, Korea, and Italy
The above analysis revealed an interesting balance of similarities and differ-
ences in the processes of introducing MCWs in Japan, Korea, and Italy ; these
differences were in the magnitude of MCWs introduced, the variety thereof,
and the rationales for their introduction.
Similarities
On one hand, there are remarkable similarities between the three countries :
i. Since all three of the countries originally had a very restrictive migrant re-
gime and, authorized accession of MCWs began as a small and awkward
step. The reception of authorized MCWs has still been far below the de-
mand for MCWs.
ii. Interestingly, though the quantities and the qualities of MCWs have varied,
the introduction of MCWs has not altered the nature of the familialistic
welfare regimes fundamentally, in that care services by MCWs support the
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pivotal role of families in LTC. In all three countries, MCWs have been fill-
ing the gap between the demand and the supply of care, and facility care
has not developed remarkably.
iii. In all three cases, international competition in the global care chains has
affected the choices made by both the receiving countries and the MCWs
(Sassen 2003 in Lee 2015), and MCWs should be rephrased not as passive
players but as strategic actors. The case of Filipino immigrants is typical.13
Differences
On the other hand, some differences between the three cases are worth not-
ing :
i. The magnitude of the introduction has been structural in Italy, limited but
significant in Korea, and tightly restrictive in Japan. The relevance of un-
authorized MCWs corresponds to this sequence ; Italy has an outstand-
ingly large pool of illegal MCWs.
ii. In Korea, and less intensively in Japan, marriage immigrants (female) were
introduced in response to the crisis of families, which was due to a massive
exodus of young people and falling birth rates in rural areas. Facing a se-
vere shortage of care labor, the two governments promoted the inflow of
these female immigrants. In the countries with restrictive immigration poli-
cies, marriage migration is the easiest and cheapest means available for
women who wish to immigrate (Lee 2015). On the other hand, the Italian
government did not have to pursue such a policy because of the large po-
13 As Parrenas (2001 : 7) explained, “Though often categorized as professionals,
Filipino migrants do in fact also end up filling semi- and low-skilled occupations.
To counteract this downward trend, Filipinos use their English-language skills and
seek wage employment.” Also according to Parrenas (2001 : 38), “the gender
makeup of Filipino migrant populations in various nations is highly incongruent
…”except those in the Middle East.
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tential pool of MCWs.
iii. From a gender perspective, though women comprise almost the entire
population of MCWs in the three countries, the composition of the genera-
tions is fairly diverse. In Japan and Italy, the balances have been inclined
to younger generations. On the other hand, in Korea, the majorities are (co
-ethnic) middle-aged women.
iv. The ethnic composition is quite varied. Although, in general, both Korea
and Japan have preferred co-ethnic immigration , only Korea has inten-
sively recruited co-ethnic Korean MCWs ; while Japan chose ethnically dif-
ferent immigrants to be its source of MCWs. Italy has not intensively used
the co-ethnic standard.
v. The rationales for the introduction of MCWs are also different. “In Japan
and Korea, the preferred solution to growing care needs is pro-natalism,
with immigration regarded as a secondary and a less ideal approach…．In
both places, immigration policies remain tentative and more economy- and
industrial development-focused” (Michel and Peng 2012 : 409). Contrast-
ingly, the introduction of MCWs in Italy was originally a product of the de-
facto reaction of the shortage of care labor by the elderly themselves .
However, it was soon to be regarded as one of the country’s principal wel-
fare policies.
Variables and strategic interaction
The outcome of this comparative analysis should be seen as a result of the
strategic interaction between the demand side (e.g., the elderly, the govern-
ments of the receiving countries) and the supply side (MCWs) in institutional
opportunities set by, mainly, two variables : the mode of financing LTC and the
degree of upward mobility for the MCWs.
In this interaction, the “strategic-ness” inevitably will bring about uncertainty
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about the preferences of the other party. Thus, in some cases, the policy out-
come cannot fit the expectation of welfare maximization and will be full of mis-
matches, gaps, and conflicts. A typical case is the introduction of the LTCI and
certified care workers in Korea : Both the demand side (the elderly and the
Korean government) and the supply side (MCWs) expected that a better qual-
ity of care services could be provisioned with the better working conditions.
However, the result was only a scarce provision of good public services and an
abundance of less-qualified private and unauthorized services. Of course, there
are other large and small failures in other cases.
4.2. Mapping the outcomes of the comparative analysis
As the Figure 3 shows, the degree of regulation in financing LTC and the mo-
bility of MCWs have had a profound impact on the characteristics and the va-
flexible mobility
self-paid finance
Italy
(unauthorized)
Italy
(authorized)
regulated finance
Korea
(unauthorized)
Japan
(authorized)
Korea
(authorized)
rigid mobility
Note : authorized=migrant care workers with national care worker framework /
unauthorized=migrant care workers in private market
Figure 3 : The comparative map of the cases
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rieties of the policies in Japan, Korea, and Italy.
The analysis in this paper has shown that the coverage of regulated financing
for MCWs enhances the conditions for the introduction of MCWs and, as a re-
sult, favors the introduction of limited numbers of authorized MCWs. The cov-
erage of the LTCI in Japan is comprehensive and has crowded out unauthor-
ized migrants. On the other hand, the coverage of the LTCI in Korea and of the
nationwide collective agreements in Italy is far from comprehensive and has
left more room for unauthorized MCWs.
The analysis has also shown that the upward mobility of MCWs influences
the quantities and qualities of MCWs. Rigid mobility in Japan has discouraged
MCWs from entering the care labor market. Flexible mobility in Italy and Korea
(by unauthorized MCWs) has encouraged MCWs to enter the care labor market
as a first step of entry into developed countries, but this mobility might induce
them to leave the care market in the medium and long term. In the cases of co
-ethnic migrants whose mobility is restricted as a condition of favored treat-
ment for granting a visa, especially in Korea, MCWs have few opportunities
other than working in the care market.
4.3. Suggestion for the future research : Beyond the marketization of
migrant care workers
The introduction of MCWs has been “invented” as a remedy for the families
suffering in the LTC crisis. In that sense, the introduction of MCWs can be
seen as an innovation, overriding the limits of the familialistic welfare regime of
each country.
In existing arguments, the introduction of the LTCI in Japan and Korea was
said to have universalized the LTC, while cash and care policies in Italy were
seen as a typical marketization of LTC. Nevertheless, they could be a similar al-
ternative in that the family has to pay for care services from the market.
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It is argued that marketization processes and immigration controls have con-
tributed to the employment of migrant workers across so-called informal/formal
types of care provision and irregular/regular types of care work and migration
(Shutes and Chiatti 2012). In this paper, such argument has also been sup-
ported for the cases of Italy and Korea. On the other hand, the limit of this
reasoning is shown in the Japanese case. When there is a sufficient pool of po-
tential care workers in the domestic labor market, and the employment of care
workers is regularized by a national qualification system, MCWs are faced with
the problem of meeting high qualifications (which are sometimes “localized” in
terms of language, exam, working conditions, etc.) for jobs that did not origi-
nally require a high-level skills.
The logic behind the marketization of care services by MCWs, however ,
should not be straightforward. Behind such an argument might be the premise
that the supply should meet the demand?that is, the number of MCWs should
increase as the elderly seek to employ them, and the price of care service
should (easily) be adjusted to the balance between demand and supply. This
paper has argued that this is not true. First, the supply of MCWs also depends
on the push factors in their home countries and the strategic actions of the
MCWs themselves. Therefore, there can be a serious shortage (as in the 1990 s
in Italy or in the early 2000 s in Japan) or an excess (as in private care in Ko-
rea). Second, the price can be flexible when there is an affluent pool of un-
regulated MCWs (as in the case of Italy). On the other hand, the price can be
more rigid since it often is regulated publicly (as in the Japanese LTCI system
or the national wage-setting in Italy).
The comparative analysis in this paper has shed light on the importance of
focusing on the strategic interaction between the demand side (e.g., the elderly,
the governments of the receiving countries) and the supply side (MCWs) of
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welfare services. Therefore, it will contribute to a better understanding of the
nexus between welfare politics and migration politics in a globalizing political
economy by focusing, not only on the demand side of welfare services, but also
on the supply side.
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